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INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2009, a U.S. cruise missile struck a village in southern
Yemen, killing forty-one members of two families-half of whom were child-
ren,' ages one to fifteen.' The target was an alleged al Qaeda-affiliated training
camp in the same region,' but according to the Yemeni parliamentary commit-
tee that investigated the strike, "there were errors in the geographic coordinates
and the determination of the location." 4 The United States initially refused to
comment, while Yemeni authorities claimed that it had been their own fighter
* Senior Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR). Ms. Kebriaei is lead
counsel for CCR in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192 (D.D.C.), which seeks ac-
countability for the killing of three American citizens in U.S. drone strikes in Ye-
men, and was counsel in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010),
which challenged the authorization for the targeting of an American citizen placed
on government "kill lists."
1. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Yemen: Images of Missile and Cluster
Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack (June 7, 2010), http://www.amnesty
.org/en/for- media/press- releases/yemen-images-missile-and-cluster-munitions
-point-us-role-fatal-attack-2010-.
2. Drones Team, Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011, BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com
/2012/03/29/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-since-2001 (reporting the Decem-
ber 17, 2009 strike and listing victims' ages).
3. Comm. in the Provinces of Lahj and Abyen, Investigating Committee's Report on
Security Events in the Province of Abyen, COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 5, 7 (Feb. 7, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/files/2010-02-07%20
-%2oThe%2Yemeni%2Parliamentary2oReport ENG.pdf.
4. Id. at 7.
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jets that had killed dozens of "militants" in simultaneous operations.' Nearly a
year after the strike, however, the media reported government cables obtained
by Wikileaks that made the United States' role clear: during a conversation be-
tween former CIA Director David Petraeus and then-Yemeni President Ali Ab-
dullah Saleh, the Yemeni leader assured Petraeus that the Yemenis would "con-
tinue saying the bombs are ours, not yours."'
The attack in al-Majalah was the second known U.S. strike in Yemen since
9/n,l and the first authorized by the Obama Administration Since then, the
United States has carried out dozens of operations in Yemen as part of an ex-
panding program of "targeted killing."9 While the government deployed cruise
missiles in the strike in al-Majalah in 2009 and today relies largely on un-
manned drones in targeted killing operations, its underlying claim of authority
is the same-that pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Forceo
5. See, e.g., Jeremy Scahill, The Dangerous US Game in Yemen, NATION, Apr. 18, 2011,
at 15 (reporting the Pentagon's initial refusal to comment on the strike and quot-
ing the Yemeni government's statement claiming responsibility for the "simulta-
neous raids killing and detaining militants"); Robert F. Worth, Yemen Says Strikes
Against Qaeda Bases Killed 34, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/world/middleeast/18yemen.html (reporting that "Yeme-
ni security forces" conducted the strike on militant bases).
6. Michael Isikoff, Yemen Cable Gives al-Qaida New 'Recruiting' Tool, MSNBC, Nov.
30, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4o42371o/ns/us-news-security/t/yemen
-cable-gives-al-qaida-new-recruiting-tool/#.UMbs2JPjnyP (quoting a Wikileaks
cable's account of a January 4, 2010 meeting in Yemen between CIA Director Da-
vid Petraeus and Yemeni officials); see Scahill, supra note 5, at 17.
7. The first credibly reported U.S. strike in Yemen post-9/11 was by an unmanned
CIA drone that killed six people-including an American citizen-on November
3, 2002. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
Study on Targeted Killings, 5 19, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/I14/24
/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); see Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen
in Yemen Missile Strike; Action's Effectiveness, Legality Questioned, WASH. PosT,





8. See Drones Team, supra note 2 (describing the strike as "the first known US attack
in Yemen in seven years").
9. See Covert War on Terror - the Data, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-datal (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013) [hereinafter BIJ, Covert War] (documenting U.S. strikes in Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia).
t0. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
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passed by Congress in response to 9/11 and pursuant to international law," the
United States may kill suspected terrorists outside of the usual constraints on
the use of lethal force, potentially anywhere targets may be found. As high-
ranking Administration officials have discussed," the government may conduct
such killings on the premise of a global armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Tali-
ban, and "associated forces," and as a matter of national self-defense. Con-
ducted by the CIA and the covert Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) of
the U.S. military, these operations target individuals not just in the battlefield in
Afghanistan, but also routinely or increasingly in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia,
and perhaps beyond. The program that President Obama claims to keep te-
thered "on a very tight leash" 4 has nonetheless killed between 2,000 and 4,000
people, according to various estimates," though the Administration refuses to
ni. This Essay focuses on the Administration's claimed international law authority to
conduct targeted killings globally, outside of traditional battlefield contexts.
12. See, e.g., John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism
Strategy (April 30, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org
/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy) ("As a matter of in-
ternational law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida, the Tali-
ban and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use
force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense. There is nothing
in international law... that prohibits us from using lethal force against our ene-
mies outside of an active battlefield.. ..").
13. See, e.g., July 2012 Update: US Covert Actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www
.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/o8/01/july-2012-update-us-covert-actions- in
-pakistan-yemen-and-somalial (referencing news sources reporting possible U.S.
drone strikes in the Philippines in 20o6 and February 2012).
14. See Obama Defends US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, BBC NEWS, Jan. 31> 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16804247 (quoting President Oba-
ma's responses to questions posed during an online "hangout" on Google's social
network, Google+).
15. See BIJ, Covert War, supra note 9 (estimating between 2,604 and 3,407 deaths from
2004 through 2012 in Pakistan, between 371 and 1,o77 deaths from 2002 through
2012 in Yemen, and between 58 and 170 deaths from 2007 through 2012 in Soma-
lia); Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012, NEW AM. FOUND.,
http://counterterrorism .newamerica.net/drones (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (esti-
mating between 1,919 and 3,224 deaths from drone strikes from 2004 through 2012
in Pakistan); Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in
Pakistan, 2004-2012, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan
-strikes.php (last updated Jan. 6, 2013, 1:54 PM) (estimating 2,592 deaths from
20o6 through 2012 in Pakistan); Bill Roggio & Bob Barry, Charting the Data for US
Air Strikes in Yemen, 2002-2012, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwar
journal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code /Yemen-strike.php (last updated Jan. 3, 2013,
2:50 PM) (estimating 380 deaths from 2002 through 2012 in Yemen); see also Greg
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release its own data. Indeed, the CIA still maintains in litigation that the pro-
gram's very existence is a secret that it can neither confirm nor deny.'"
In discussing the Administration's counterterrorism strategy during his ad-
dress at Yale Law School in February 2012,17 Jeh Johnson, then the General
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, articulated several sound state-
ments of principle and policy, but none account for the Obama Administra-
tion's targeted killing program. This Essay traces the distance between principle
and practice with respect to four aspects of that program: the premise of a
world-ranging armed conflict, the scope of who can be targeted, the Adminis-
tration's continued withholding of information, and its opposition to judicial
review.
1. INDEFINITE WORLDWIDE WAR
"All of us recognize that this should not be the normal way ofthings. . .
For more than eleven years, the United States has been involved in a de-
clared "war on terror"'9 or "armed conflict with Al Qaeda."2 o The full costs
Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends To Keep Adding Names to
Kill Lists, WASH. PosT, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep
-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/1o/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a 5 5 c-3 9 4 08fbe6a4 b
_story.html ("The number of militants and civilians killed in the (U.S.] drone
campaign over the past ten years will soon exceed 3,ooo by certain esti-
mates....").
16. Brief for Appellee at 43, ACLU v. CIA, No. 11-5320 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2012)
("Notwithstanding widespread reports that drone strikes occur, the CIA has never
confirmed or denied whether it has any involvement or intelligence interest in any
of those drone strikes, or whether it maintains any records relating to those drone
strikes.").
17. Jeh Charles Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama
Administration, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (2013).
18. Id. at 149.
19. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the lo7th Con-
gress (Sept. 20, 2001), in SELECTED SPEECHES OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH,
2001 - 2008, at 65, 68 (White House ed. 2011) ("Our war on terror begins with Al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.").
20. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administra-
tion and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139i19.htm) ("[TIhe United States is in
an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in
response to the horrific 9/n attacks . .. .").
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cannot be quantified, but tens of thousands of people have been killed" and de-
tained," millions have been displaced, 3 and trillions of dollars have been spent
and committed. 4 Public opposition to the war in Afghanistan reached an
all-time high last year, and individuals from across the political spectrum now
agree that the United States should end its involvement in that conflict-the
longest in U.S. history. But even as the Administration signals a weakening al
Qaeda26 and moves to withdraw from Afghanistan, and even as President Ob-
ama assures that after "more than a decade under the dark cloud of war. . . we
can see the light of a new day on the horizon," 7 the Administration admits that
its global war with al Qaeda will continue." Recent interviews with senior Ad-
21. See Afghanistan: 15,500 - 17,400 Civilians Killed, CosTs or WAR, http://costsofwar
.org/article/afghan-civiians (last updated Nov. 2012) (reporting that at least 15,500
civilians have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001); Iraqi Civilians: 122,ooo -
132,000 Civilians Killed, CosTs or WAR, http://costsofwar.org/article/iraqi
-civilians (last updated Nov. 2012) (reporting that at least 122,000 civilians have
been killed in Iraq since 2003); US and Allied Killed, CosTs or WAR,
http://costsofwar.org/articlelus-killed-o (last updated Nov. 2012) (reporting that
over 6,600 U.S. troops, at least 2,871 private contractors working for the Pentagon,
and at least 24,824 uniformed Afghans, Iraqis, and other allies have died in Iraq
and Afghanistan since 2001).
22. See Eisenhower Study Grp., The Costs of War Since 2oo: Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, CosTs or WAR 10-11 (June 2011), http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files
/Executive%2oReport%20CostS%20ofi/20War%2oDecember%202011.docx (report-
ing that the United States has detained hundreds of thousands of individuals in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, with at least ioo,ooo detained in Iraq alone).
23. See id. at 6 (categorizing 7,815,ooo Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani civilians as
war-related refugees or displaced persons).
24. See Economic Costs Summary: $3.2 - 4 Trillion and Counting, CosTs OF WAR,
http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary (last visited Dec. 20, 2012)
(tabulating between 3.2 and 4 trillion dollars in U.S. war-related outlays from 2001
through 2011).
25. See James Dao & Andrew W. Lehren, In Toll of 2,ooo, New Portrait of Afghan War,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/us/war-in
-afghanistan-claims-20ooth-american-life.html; Ann Gearan, AP-GfK Poll: Sup-
port for War in Afghanistan at New Low of 27 Percent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9,
2012, http://ap-gfkpoll.com /uncategorized/may-2012-poll-findings; Elisabeth
Bumiller & Allison Kopicki, Support in U.S. for Afghan War Drops Sharply, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o3/27
/world/asialsupport-for-afghan-war-falls-in-us-poll-finds.html.
26. See Brennan, supra note 12 ("In short, al-Qa'ida is losing badly.").
27. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation from Bagram Air Base, Afghanis-
tan (May 1, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/2012/05/ol/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan).
28. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Defense, The Conflict
Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012) (transcript
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ministration officials suggest that the "war" has only reached its "midpoint,"
and evidence shows that the Administration is ramping up, not winding down,
the targeted killing program. 9 Despite the rhetoric of a new day dawning, offi-
cials acknowledge that the targeted killing program is "something that is poten-
tially indefinite." 30
As Johnson recognized, this should not be the "normal way of things.""
Armed conflict is an exceptional situation, defined as intense violence between
organized armed groups.32 Those exceptional conditions trigger exceptional
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the
-oxford-union) ("In the current conflict with al Qaeda, I can offer no prediction
about when this conflict will end, or whether we are ... near the 'beginning of the
end."'). But see id. (stating that there will come "a tipping point" where al Qaeda
has been "effectively destroyed" and U.S. efforts "should no longer be considered
an 'armed conflict' against al Qaeda and its associated forces").
29. Miller, supra note 15 (assessing interviews with dozens of current and former na-
tional security officials to examine the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism poli-
cies); see Michael Hastings, The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to
War in Secret, ROLLING STONE, April 16, 2012 (discussing "the increasingly central
role that drones now play in American foreign policy").
30. Miller, supra note 15.
31. Johnson, supra note 17, at 149; see Johnson, supra note 28 ("'War' must be re-
garded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs.... In its 12th year,
we must not accept the current conflict ... as the 'new normal."').
32. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-9 4-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yu-
goslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (finding that an "armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between go-
vernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State"); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 1f 90-
99 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (finding that "daily
clashes between the [Kosovo Liberation Army] and the Serbian forces" and the
"unprecedented scale of deployment of the [Yugoslav Army] forces" met the "in-
tensity requirement" necessary to classify the hostilities as an armed conflict);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96- 4 -T, Judgement, 619-25 (Sept. 2, 1998) (recog-
nizing that "an armed conflict is distinguished from internal disturbances by the
level of intensity of the conflict and the degree of organization of the parties to the
conflict"); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,1998,
art. 8(2)(f), 2187 U.N.T.S. go (conferring jurisdiction over "armed conflicts that
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict be-
tween governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups"); European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commis-
sion), Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners,
Opinion No. 363/2005, CDL-AD (20o6) oo9 (Mar. 17, 20o6), 5 78 (suggesting that
"sporadic bombings and other violent acts which terrorist networks perpetrate in
different places around the globe and the ensuing counter-terrorism measures...
cannot be said to amount to an 'armed conflict"'); 3 COMMENTARY ON THE GE-
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rules-the laws of war-that permit deprivations of life and liberty that would
normally be prohibited.33 The resort to armed force as a means of self-
defense-the Administration's additional rationale for targeted killing3 4-is al-
so an extreme measure, one traditionally reserved to justify an armed response
to an "armed attack." 5 The international community intended for the interna-
tional law of war and self-defense to apply in limited, extraordinary circums-
tances.36 Yet the Administration claims the authority to apply these rules global-
ly and indefinitely in carrying out a U.S. killing program that has been
escalating for years.3 1
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 35-36 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (listing
"convenient criteria" for recognizing an "armed conflict").
33. See Declaration of Mary Ellen O'Connell ! 7, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d
1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. lO-cv-o1469) ("The combatant's privilege is necessitated by
the exigencies of military conflict."); Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Bat-
tlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone,
161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 21) (on file with author)
(discussing the author's view that "[t]he exigencies that justify application of war-
time rules simply do not apply outside zones of active hostilities").
34. Koh, supra note 20.
35. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."); id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."); see also Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 7,
5 45 (recognizing that "state practice" recognizes the right to use force in
self-defense against a "real and imminent threat").
36. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges
from the "War on Terror," FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2003, at 55,
63-64 ("[The] inapplicability of humanitarian law to aspects of the War on Terror
that do not meet the criteria [for armed conflict] should be viewed as a benefit ra-
ther than an obstacle or collision. ... Where the lex specialis of humanitarian law
is active... humanity is denied some very fundamental protections provided by
other legal regimes."); 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, Nov. 28 - Dec. 1, 2011, International Humanitarian Law and the Chal-
lenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, io-n, I.C.R.C. Doc. 311C/11/5.1.2 (Oct.
2011) [hereinafter I.C.R.C. Report] ("It should be borne in mind that [interna-
tional humanitarian law] rules governing the use of force ... are less restrictive
than the rules applicable outside of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of
law.. .. [I]t is believed to be inappropriate and unnecessary to apply [internation-
al humanitarian law] to situations that do not amount to armed conflict.").
37. See BIJ, Covert War, supra note 9; see also Hastings, supra note 29 ("Obama's
drone program... amounts to the largest unmanned aerial offensive ever con-
ducted in military history-, never have so few killed so many by remote control.").
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The geographic scope of the program is expanding in part because of whom
the Administration believes it can target in connection with its armed conflict.
Outside of Afghanistan, the targets are largely "associated forces" of al Qaeda
that the Administration asserts are "cobelligerents," analogizing controversially
to the relationship between third-party states and warring parties in situations
of international armed conflict. Even if the analogy were appropriate, it is far
from clear that the groups at issue are sufficiently organized and "associated"
with al Qaeda to render them cobelligerents under international law. To the ex-
tent these groups are untethered to the armed conflict between the United
States and al Qaeda, the laws of war do not apply. Domestic and international
human rights law is the correct framework. Outside of the United States, this is
not controversial. It is the framework that the international community has
generally recognized as appropriate for dealing with acts of terrorism, and the
one that close allies of the United States have applied in responding to attacks
on their own soil, including after 9/11. Indeed, it is the framework the United
States itself upheld in condemning targeted killings by other countries before
9/11.38
The broad geographic scope of the program is also based on the Adminis-
tration claims that the laws of war permit the United States to target individuals
potentially anywhere they are located, even in areas that do not exhibit the bat-
tlefield conditions that justify those exceptional rules.39 That position is not on-
ly highly legally contested, 40 including by some of the United States' closest
38. See Scott Shane, Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for
-drone-rule-book.html ("For years before the Sept. ii, 20ol, attacks, the United
States routinely condemned targeted killings of suspected terrorists by Israel, and
most countries still object to such measures.").
39. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at Northwestern University School of
Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag
/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203o51.html) ("Our legal authority is not limited to the
battlefields in Afghanistan.... We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to
shifting operations from country to country."); see also Brennan, supra note 12
(discussing the U.S. practice of targeting "beyond hot battlefields like Afghanis-
tan").
4o. See, e.g., I.C.R.C. Report, supra note 36, at lo ("It should be reiterated that the
ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global dimensions is or has been
taking place."); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Ex-
ecutions, supra note 7, 95 53-56 (expressing skepticism that the United States is in
armed conflict with al Qaeda outside Afghanistan and Iraq); Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RIcH. L. REV. 845, 858 (2009)
("In addition to exchange, intensity, and duration [of fighting], armed conflicts
have a spatial dimension. It is not the case that if there is an armed conflict in one
state-for example, Afghanistan-that all the world is at war, or even that
Afghanis and Americans are at war with each other all over the planet."); Daskal,
supra note 33 (manuscript at 20-29) (distinguishing between the rules that should
apply within zones of active hostilities and elsewhere); Ben Emmerson, Special
Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism & Human Rights, United Nations, Speech at
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allies, 41 but also dangerous: according to the International Committee of the
Red Cross, "the notion that a person 'carries' a [noninternational armed con-
flict] with him when he moves to the territory of a nonbelligerent state should
not be accepted." Accepting such a view, and the attendant "proposition that
harm or damage could lawfully be inflicted on [civilians or civilian objects] in
operation of the [International Humanitarian Law] principle of proportionality
because an individual sought by another state is in their midst ... would in ef-
fect mean recognition of the concept of a 'global battlefield.'" 4
The Administration has responded to accusations that it employs armed
force "whenever or wherever [it] want[s]" by citing respect for other nations'
sovereignty as a constraint on its own actions. 44 Indeed, the UN Charter pro-
tects the right to state sovereignty and generally prohibits one nation from us-
ing aggressive force in another's territory.45 The Charter does establish a narrow
exception to this prohibition: a nation may use extraterritorial force to respond
in self-defense to an "armed attack." 4 But the Administration's interpretation
of "self-defense" has significantly broadened that exception. First, where a for-
Harvard Law School (Oct. 25, 2012) (transcript available at
http://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/io/harvard-speech.doc)
("The global war paradigm was always based on the flimsiest of reasoning, and
was not supported even by close allies of the US. The first term Obama adminis-
tration initially retreated from this approach, but over the past 18 months it has
begun to rear its head once again, in briefings by administration officials seeking
to provide a legal justification for the drone programme of targeted killing in Pa-
kistan, Yemen and Somalia.").
41. See John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Coun-
terterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws
(Sept. 16, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/20u/o/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering
-our-values-an) ("An area in which there is some disagreement is the geographic
scope of the conflict. The United States does not view our authority to use mili-
tary force against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields like Afg-
hanistan.... Others in the international community-including some of our
closest allies and partners-take a different view of the geographic scope of the
conflict, limiting it only to the 'hot' battlefields."); see also Daskal, supra note 33
(manuscript at 29) (recognizing that key European allies of the United States view
the conflict with Al Qaeda as limited to "hot" battlefields); Emmerson, supra note
40 ("The [global] war paradigm ... was not supported even by close allies of the
US.").
42. I.C.R.C. Report, supra note 36, at 22.
43. Id.
44. Holder, supra note 39; see Brennan, supra note 12 ("We do not use force whenever
we want, wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect for a
state's sovereignty and the laws of war, impose constraints.").
45. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
46. Id. art 51.
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eign state has not consented to the use of force, the Administration asserts that
it may nevertheless use force if that state is "unable or unwilling to deal effec-
tively with a threat to the United States."4 7 Whether force is permissible in "un-
able or unwilling" situations is an unsettled question 4 but even scholars who
view the test as proper argue that it is too indeterminate to serve as a meaning-
ful constraint.49 Second, while state practice supports the use of force in re-
sponse to an imminent threat of armed attack-where "the necessity of...
self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation" 0-the Administration has argued for the oxymoronic
notion of "elongated imminence."" Even when the use of force does not violate
a state's sovereignty, however, the question of whether it violates the rights of
the targeted individual and bystanders is separate and distinct." Unless target-
47. Holder, supra note 39; see Brennan, supra note 12 ("There is nothing in interna-
tional law that ... prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside
of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or
unwilling to take action against the threat.").
48. See Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 488 (2012) ("It is worth noting
that this test is not the only standard around which states could have coalesced.");
id. at 488-89 & n.16 (noting alternate regimes that the Article does not explore in
detail); Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with
Al-Qaeda, and It's a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 115,
140 (2011) ("It is no longer clear whether such uses of force [in unwilling or unable
situations] are ever permissible in the Charter era...."); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Comment, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations, 21 J.L.
INFO. & ScI. 116, 128-33 (2011) (arguing that neither the U.N. Charter nor the deci-
sions of the International Court of Justice permit one state to use lethal force in
another state because that second state is "weak," but recognizing debate among
scholars).
49. See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 48, at 503-33 (2012) (recognizing the theory's "lack of
clear legal content" but suggesting ways to define and apply the test more clearly).
50. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra
note 7, 5 45 (quoting R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline & McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L
L. 82, 89 (1938)).
51. DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 218 (2012) (discussing Department of State Legal Advi-
sor Harold Koh's views of the circumstances in which the use of force outside of
battlefields would be permissible in self-defense); see also Brennan, supra note 41(arguing for "a more flexible understanding of 'imminence"').
52. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra
note 7, 5 44 ("[Elven if the use of inter-state force is offered as justification for a
targeted killing, it does not dispose of the further question of whether the killing
of the particular targeted individual or individuals is lawful."); see also I.C.R.C.
Report, supra note 36, at 21 (recognizing that the legality of extraterritorial target-
ing "requires an analysis of the lawfulness of the resort to force by one state in the
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ing occurs in the context of armed conflict, the laws of war do not apply, and
the legality of the killings depends instead on domestic and international hu-
man rights law."
While the Administration's broad and tenuous legal interpretations have
thus helped to "sustain[] a seemingly permanent war" through the targeted kill-
ing program, 4 the peculiarities of the Administration's new weapons arsenal
also play a role. Precision-guided munitions and unmanned drones have made
killing cheaper and easier than ever before." Remote-controlled, unmanned
drones render domestic blowback from troop casualties a nonissue." The accre-
tion of foreign casualties, though steady, is slow and, moreover, denied by the
government. Indeed, the continuing opacity surrounding the targeted killing
program allows the Administration to continue insisting that only "militants"
are being killed. Finally, the advanced technical capabilities of drones can lead
to a dangerous conflation of precision with lawfulness and legitimacy." As
some scholars have warned, drones create the potential for perpetual asymme-
tric war.
territory of another and an analysis of the international legal framework govern-
ing the way in which force is used").
53. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra
note 7, 44 ("The legality of a specific killing depends on whether it meets the re-
quirements of [international humanitarian law] and human rights law (in the
context of armed conflict) or human rights law alone (in all other contexts).");
I.C.R.C. Report, supra note 36, at 21.
54. Miller, supra note 15.
55. See Hastings, supra note 29 (recognizing the "low cost" and "lethal convenience"
of drones, and arguing that the "immediacy and secrecy of drones make it easier
than ever for leaders to unleash America's military might"); see also Mary Dud-
ziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1694-96 (discuss-
ing the 1991 Iraq War, which relied largely on air power, not ground troops, as es-
tablishing a "new American way of conflict... that was not meant to feel like a
war").
56. See Hastings, supra note 29 (noting that drones "limit[] U.S. casualties" and con-
sequently "provoke no 'political cost' in the U.S."); John Kaag & Sarah Kreps, The
Moral Hazard of Drones, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 22, 2012, 5:15 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/the-moral-hazard-of-drones.
57. See Brennan, supra note 12 ("[Wie only authorize a particular operation against a
specific individual if we have a high degree of confidence that the individual being
targeted is indeed the terrorist we are pursuing."); Kaag & Kreps, supra note 56.
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II. SCOPE OF TARGETS
"[W]e must guard against aggressive interpretations ... that will discredit
our efforts, provoke controversy, and invite challenge."I'
One of the most controversial aspects of the targeted killing program-
even among those who accept the premise that an armed conflict with al Qaeda
permits targeting beyond actual battlefields-is the Administration's view of
whom it can target within such a conflict. 9 That view, contrary to the re-
strained approach that Johnson advocated in his address,"o is based upon novel
and aggressive interpretations of international law that have indeed generated
intense opposition, not least from people directly affected.
As an initial matter, the Administration claims that it may target "asso-
ciated force[s]" of al Qaeda as "cobelligerent[s].""' The Administration reaches
that conclusion by drawing an analogy to a separate concept from the law of
neutrality, which originated in the nineteenth century to regulate the conduct
of states during international armed conflicts. According to established prin-
ciples of the law of neutrality, third-party states have the right to neutrality by
58. Johnson, supra note 17, at 145.
59. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents 64 (Cornell Law Faculty
Working Papers, Paper No. 92, 2011) (explaining that "there are multiple prob-
lems associated with linking an individual to the larger terrorist organization that
is engaged in an armed conflict with the United States"); Kenneth Anderson, Self
Defense and Non-International Armed Conflict in Drone Warfare, VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:31 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/22/self
-defense-and-non-international-armed-conflict-in-drone-warfare ("The non-
international armed conflict goes where the participants go; and likewise if new
groups engage in co-belligerent action, then they become part of the armed con-
flict. But it has seemed to me in the past several years that some of these groups
are in other places and not obviously connected, except by a forced abstraction, to
the groups under the AUMF."); Gabor Rona, Thoughts on Brennan's Speech,
OPINIo JURIS (May 2, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/o2/thoughts
-on-brennans-speech/ (objecting to Brennan's assertion that individuals who are
"part of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces" are legitimate targets as a "sweeping
and incorrect claim of who is targetable under international law"). But see Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Ter-
rorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2109-16 (2005) (advancing a broader understand-
ing of which individuals and organizations are included within the AUMF and
noting that "all members of Al Qaeda" may be targeted).
60. Johnson, supra note 17.
61. Id. at 146 ("An 'associated force,' as we interpret the phrase, has two characteris-
tics: (1) it is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al
Qaeda, and (2) it is a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.").
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default." When they violate neutrality in favor of one party, however, those
third-party states may be designated "cobelligerents" of the favored party and
become subject to lawful attack." As traditionally understood, the concept of a
"cobelligerent" under the law of neutrality referred to state entities.4 While the
law of neutrality has been invoked in certain situations of noninternational
armed conflict involving nonstate groups," it became appropriate in such con-
texts only after states recognized such groups as legitimate cobelligerents, with
the same rights and privileges as the opposing state's armed forces.66 Applying
the concept to irregular terrorist groups as the Administration does here-for
example, analogizing the relationship between al Shabaab and al Qaeda to the
62. See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 307 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1952) (explaining that a state is and remains neutral until it chooses to become a
cobelligerent or participates in the hostilities).
63. See, e.g., id. §§ 357-60 (discussing circumstances that terminate neutral status);
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 59, at 2112 (explaining that a state can become a
cobelligerent by "participat[ing] in acts of war by the belligerent," "supply[ing]
war materials to a belligerent," or "permit[ting] belligerents to use its territory to
move troops or munitions, or to establish wartime communication channels").
But see Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with
Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 75, 87-88 (2011) (explaining that actions favoring one
belligerent party to a conflict do not necessarily bring neutrality to an end).
64. See, e.g., 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 62, § 293 (defining neutrality as "the attitude of
impartiality adopted by third States towards belligerents and recognised by belli-
gerents ... creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the bellige-
rents"); Tess Bridgeman, The Law of Neutrality and the Conflict with Al Qaeda,
Note, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1197 (2010) ("Broadly speaking, the law of neutrality
regulates the coexistence of states at war and states at peace.").
65. See Heller, supra note 48, at 118 (noting that the law of neutrality is capable of ap-
plying in the noninternational armed conflict context of civil war).
66. See id. at 122 (explaining that neutrality law has applied to insurgencies where: "(1)
a general armed conflict was underway within the state; (2) the insurgents con-
trolled a significant portion of national territory; (3) the insurgents respected the
laws of war and engaged in hostilities through organized armed forces under re-
sponsible command; and (4) the hostilities affected third states to the point that
they needed to adopt a position concerning the legal status of those hostilities").
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relationship between Vichy France and Germany in World War I'7-finds no
support in state practice or opiniojuris.6
Even assuming that the concept can be logically applied in this context,
however, it is far from clear that the targeted nonstate groups are sufficiently
related to al Qaeda to qualify as its cobelligerents. According to Johnson, more
than a shared ideology is required to establish the cobelligerent relationship. 9
Nevertheless, the list of al Qaeda "affiliates" and "adherents" whom the U.S. has
already targeted-or whom it suggests it will target in the future-raises ques-
tions about how much more is required.7 o While Johnson stated that U.S.
67. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 63, at 90 n.63 (describing as an "archetypal example of
co-belligerency... the entrance of Vichy France into the conflict alongside Ger-
many in World War II"); see also Oona Hathaway et al., The Power To Detain: De-
tention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 12 n.50) (on file with author) (recognizing Vichy France as the
"regularly cited example of the United States's past practice in targeting co-
belligerents").
68. John C. Denn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case ofAnwar Al-
Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 200 (2011), http://www.pennumbra
.com/debates/pdfs/TargetedKilling.pdf ("There are actually numerous reasons
why cobelligerency does not apply to nonstate actors in NIAC. The most impor-
tant, of course, is the complete absence of state practice or opinio juris supporting
the existence of such a customary rule."); see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866,
873 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing as "folly" an "attempt to apply the rules of
co-belligerency" to a nonstate entity); see also Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, In-
ternational Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Con-
flicts, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 719, 725 (2007) ("To say that a global international
war is being waged against groups such as Al-Qaeda would mean that, under the
laws of war, their followers should be considered to have the same rights and obli-
gations as members of regular armed forces. It was already clear in 1949 that no
nation would contemplate exempting members of non-State armed groups from
criminal prosecution under domestic law for acts of war that were not prohibited
under international law-which is the crux of combatant and prisoner-of-war
status.").
69. Johnson, supra note 17, at 146 ("[A]n "associated force" is not any terrorist group
in the world that merely embraces the al Qaeda ideology. More is required before
we draw the legal conclusion that the group fits within the statutory authorization
for the use of military force passed by the Congress in 2001.").
70. See Brennan, supra note 12 (mentioning al Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
in North and West Africa, and Boko Haram in Nigeria as "affiliates" and "adhe-
rents" of Al Qaeda that threaten the United States). But see, e.g., Daniel L. Byman,
Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations 12 (Saban Ctr.
for Middle E. Policy at Brookings, Analysis Paper, 2012) ("[Tlhe Shebaab is still
largely independent [from the Al Qaeda core]."); Stephanie Hanson, Al-Shabaab,
COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650 (last up-
dated Aug. io, 2011) ("[M]ost analysts believe al-Shabaab's organizational links to
al-Qaeda are weak .... The strongest tie between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda seems
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courts have upheld the "associated forcels]" concept by analogy to cobellig-
erency,7 only the D.C. district and circuit courts have addressed the issue, and
in the detention context." Moreover, those courts' opinions do not usefully il-
luminate the definition of a cobelligerent, since-in most instances-each
group found to be associated either had been engaged in combat in Afghanistan
in 20o alongside the Taliban or al Qaeda, or had been concretely facilitating
attacks against U.S. forces there." The courts have not addressed the "outer
contours" of the concept-and they have certainly not approved the aggressive
interpretations on which the Administration has based its targeted killing oper-
ations. 74
In addition to its novel and aggressive legal theory with respect to groups as-
sociated with al Qaeda and the Taliban in the "armed conflict" with the United
States, the Administration has also insisted upon a controversial interpretation
with respect to individuals who may be targeted as part of those groups. In his
speech in April, Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan asserted that
the government has the authority to target "individuals who are part of al-
Qa'ida or its associated forces... just as we target[ed] enemy leaders in past
conflicts, such as German and Japanese commanders during World War II."71
However, in contrast to situations of international armed conflict between
states, where states may target each other's military forces by virtue of the non-
civilian status of the combatants, the law is more protective in armed conflicts
that involve nonstate groups-where the line distinguishing civilian from figh-
ter is far less clear.76 In such contexts, the relevant inquiry is about conduct, not
to be ideological."); Declaration of Bernard Haykel 13, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469) ("The relationship between Al Qaeda
Central ... and AQAP is not organizationally close.").
71. Johnson, supra note 17, at 146.
72. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) ("The authority
also reaches those who were members of 'associated forces,' which the Court in-
terprets to mean 'co-belligerents' as that term is understood under the law of
war.").
73. See Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872;
Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F-3d 416, 419-20 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Moreover, the court in
Harnlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, merely mentioned the cobelligerency concept without
analysis.
74. Ingber, supra note 63, at 90 n.65.
75. Brennan, supra note 12.
76. See I.C.R.C. Report, supra note 36, at 44 ("In practice, civilian direct participation
in hostilities is likely to entail significant confusion and uncertainty in the imple-
mentation of the principle of distinction.... In case of doubt, the person in ques-
tion must be presumed to be protected against direct attack."); see also Gabor Ro-
na, Brennan's Speech: A Response to Bobby Chesney, OPINIO JURIS (May 3, 2012,
11:4o AM), http://www.opiniojuris.org/2o12/o5/o3/brennans-speech-response-to
-bobby-chesney ("[International humanitarian law], which above all seeks to pro-
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status: the Administration must determine not whether individuals are "part
of' a fighting force, but whether they are "directly participating in hostilities."7
The Administration thus casts a far wider net than the law allows when it iden-
tifies as lawful targets all individuals who are "part of' al Qaeda or its associated
forces. Indeed, this policy offends the fundamental law-of-war principle of dis-
tinction.71 While the Administration has stated that it prioritizes individuals
who pose a "significant threat" over the "thousands" of individuals it could
theoretically target, that standard, nebulous as it still is, is a matter of policy, not
legal obligation.79
The reported statements of Administration officials that "all military-age
males" within a strike zone are presumed to be "combatants" adds to concerns
about the outer bounds of the Administration's standards."o This manner of
classification may explain how the Administration continues to claim that its
strikes result in few civilian casualties,"' despite evidence to the contrary."
tect civilians from the ravages of war, places a heavier burden and stricter limita-
tions on killing people outside of 'armed forces' than within them.").
77. Rona, supra note 59; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 59, at 2115 (noting that
individuals may be targeted if they take "direct part" in hostilities).
78. See I.C.R.C. Report, supra note 36, at 18-19 (describing the principle of distinction
as "first among" the basic rules governing the conduct of hostilities, requiring the
parties to "at all times distinguish between civilians, civilian objects and military
objectives").
79. Brennan, supra note 12 ("There are, after all, literally thousands of individuals
who are part of al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces, thousands upon thou-
sands.").
80. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and
Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world
/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html. The presumption holds "unless
there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent." Id.
81. See Mark Landler, Civilian Deaths Due to Drones Are Not Many, Obama Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o1/3Iworld/middleeast
/civilian-deaths-due-to-drones-are-few-obama-says.html.
82. See, e.g., STANFORD LAW SCH. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CLINIC & N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIc, LIVING UNDER DRONES:
DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PA-
KISTAN 32-35 (2012) (discussing the underreporting of civilian casualties by U.S.
government sources); BIJ, Covert War, supra note 9.
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III. TRANSPARENCY
"[W]e must adopt legal positions that comport with common sense
and fit well within the mainstream of legal thinking in the area... "
While the legality, morality, and wisdom of the targeted killing program
have been the subject of much dispute, there has been relative consensus about
at least one issue: the need for transparency about the program. To some extent,
the Administration has responded to the call. In a series of speeches in 2012, in-
cluding by Johnson, senior Administration officials have outlined various as-
pects of the program: its legal rationale, principles that inform targeting deci-
sions, and the program's geographic scope.4 In interviews with the media,
named and anonymous officials-even President Obama himself-have de-
fended and discussed certain specific targets and operations." While the Ad-
ministration's legal position still requires further explanation, and although da-
ta about the impact of the program still depends entirely on the work of
nongovernmental sources, the program's existence and basic contours are by
now beyond dispute. Indeed, in an address last April, Deputy National Security
Advisor Brennan unambiguously acknowledged: "Yes, in full accordance with
the law . .. the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against spe-
cific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using ... drones."" Brennan made clear
that he was specifically referring to strikes beyond the "hot" battlefield of Afg-
hanistan."
Given these and numerous other official public statements and leaks, the
Administration takes an incongruous position in the courtroom." In litigation,
the government continues to maintain that the very existence of the drone pro-
gram-at least to the extent that the CIA is involved-is a secret. On that basis,
the Administration has fought to withhold information about the program-
including reported legal memoranda justifying the killing of American citi-
83. Johnson, supra note 17, at 149.
84. See Brennan, supra note 12; Holder, supra note 39; Johnson, supra note 17; Koh,
supra note 20.
85. See, e.g., Becker & Shane, supra note 80 (reporting interviews with Administration
officials regarding the targeted killings of Baitullah Mehsud and Anwar
al-Awlaki); Landler, supra note 81 (reporting President Obama's "unusually can-
did public discussion of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert program").
86. Brennan, supra note 12.
87. Id.
88. See New York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 11-9336, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 979, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013) (granting the government's motion
for summary judgment in a FOIA case seeking records about the targeted killing
of U.S. citizens, but acknowledging that the Administration "has engaged in pub-
lic discussion of the legality of targeted killing, even of citizens, but in cryptic and
imprecise ways").
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zens-in pending lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 9
Under the Administration's theory, it can neither confirm nor deny whether it
even possesses relevant records because doing so would reveal the classified fact
of whether a program exists. The Administration's position has been widely
criticized, including by scholars who generally support its authority to carry out
drone strikes.9 o As one critic put it, "[tihere is no doubt that the executive
branch has manipulated the secrecy system to permit it to tell the public a lot
about a classified program without (as yet) suffering any of the disclosure obli-
gations that normally come from talking about a classified program."9 ' As a re-
sult, the Administration can make-and has made-self-serving claims about
the legality and legitimacy of the program without drawing the public scrutiny
that would ordinarily follow from fuller disclosures.
The Administration has invoked the need for secrecy about the program
not only to prevent public scrutiny in the FOIA context, but also to oppose
judicial scrutiny when fundamental individual rights have been at stake. In Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, which challenged the widely reported authorization for the
targeted killing of a U.S. citizen in Yemen,92 the Administration argued that liti-
gating the plaintiffs due process and other constitutional and human rights
claims would require disclosure of state secrets and should be barred at the out-
set on that ground alone.93 While the state-secrets privilege recognizes that a
89. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 43, ACLU v. CIA, No. 11-5320 (D.C. Cir. May 21,
2012) (seeking to bar the ACLU's FOIA request for records pertaining to the CIA's
program).
90. See, e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, The Secrets of Government Killing, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/lo/o9/opinion/sunday/the-secrets-of-govern
ment-killing.html (reporting American University law professor Kenneth Ander-
son's self-professedly "relentless" criticism of the Obama Administration's refusal
to comment on drone strikes and quoting Anderson's statement that "essentially
conducting the foreign policy of the U.S. by leaked journalism ... is [not] accept-
able"); Jack Goldsmith, More on al-Aulaqi and Transparency, LAWFARE (Oct. 5,
2011, 2:17 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2on/10/more-on-al-aulaqi-and
-transparency ("[I]t is wrong... for the government to maintain technical co-
vertness but then engage in continuous leaks, attributed to government officials,
of many (self-serving) details about the covert operations and their legal justifica-
tions. It is wrong because it is illegal.").
91. Jack Goldsmith, Thoughts on Today's Important Drone FOIA Oral Argument in DC
Circuit, LAWFARE (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:34 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09
/thoughts-on-todays-important-drone-foia-oral-argument-in-dc-circuit.
92. See Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. i:io-cv
-01469).
93. Government's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-cv-1469). The district court did not reach the state secrets issue,
but rather dismissed the case on standing and political question grounds. 727 F.
Supp. 2d at 54.
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private litigant's right of redress must sometimes yield to the executive's obliga-
tion to safeguard military secrets, the invocation of the privilege in Al-Aulaqi-
to foreclose judicial review of claims involving a threatened deprivation of
life-was unprecedented. Indeed, when it comes to the deprivation of liberty in
the criminal context, the Supreme Court has recognized that it would be "un-
conscionable to allow [the government] to undertake prosecution and then in-
voke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense."9 4 In other words, if the government had cri-
minally prosecuted Anwar al-Aulaqi, rather than targeting him for death with-
out charge or trial, invocation of the state-secrets privilege to bar adjudication
would have been impermissible.95
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
"History shows that, under the banner of 'national security,'
much damage can be done ... ."96
Johnson stated in his speech, as the Administration has argued in court,97
that targeting decisions are not appropriate for judicial review-even when
such decisions call for the use of lethal force against American citizens.9' Impli-
cit in the Administration's position is the claim that judicial review is not only
inappropriate, but also unnecessary. Lawyers on the President's national securi-
ty team debate and scrutinize each other's opinions, the Administration insists,
so all targeting decisions are subject to legal review.99 But notwithstanding the
importance of internal diligence, Johnson himself recognized that unchecked
executive policies that have been promulgated in the name of national security
can result in grave harms.' Such historical examples warn against relying on
internal processes without meaningful outside review to protect against error
and abuse.
94. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
95. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction & in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 47-49, Al-Aulaqi,
727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-cv-01469).
96. Johnson, supra note 17, at 149.
97. See Government's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi, 727
F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1o-cv-1469).
98. Johnson, supra note 17, at 148.("[C]ontrary to the view of some, targeting deci-
sions are not appropriate for submission to a court."); see also Holder, supra note
39 (discussing due process considerations with respect to the targeting of U.S. citi-
zens and asserting that "'( dlue process' and 'judicial process' are not one and the
same, particularly when it comes to national security").
99. Johnson, supra note 17, at 148.
100. Id. at 149.
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Guantdinamo is an apt example. From 2001 to 2004, the executive held
nearly 800 men on the basis of secret information and secret unilateral deter-
minations."o' While the government contended that the men detained were
dangerous terrorists who were intent on doing harm to the United States, it
withheld their names-indeed, fought FOIA requests for their disclosureo 2-
and opposed detainees' attempts to seek judicial review. In response to the first
habeas petitions filed, the government made familiar arguments: the United
States was engaged in a global armed conflict against al Qaeda and its suppor-
ters; judicial review would put the federal courts "in the unprecedented position
of micromanaging the executive's handling of captured enemy combatants"
and "second-guessing the military's determination as to which captured aliens
pose a threat to the United States"; and the absence of judicial review did not
mean the detentions were without scrutiny-from Congress and the public."o3
Years later, judicial review would reveal that the government's internal
processes for status determinations were woefully inadequate'o4 and, ultimately,
that many men had been wrongfully held and abused for years.' In rejecting
the government's arguments that judicial review should be denied, the Supreme
Court recognized that there is considerable risk of error inherent in any process
that is "closed and accusatorial," even in the presence of diligence and good
faith."o' According to the Court, where "the consequence of error may be deten-
tion of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more,
this is a risk too significant to ignore."0 7 Indeed, if the risk of prolonged arbi-
loi. The Guantanamo Docket: The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com
/guantanamo/detainees (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (indicating that 779 people have
been detained at the U.S. military prison at Guantinamo).
102. Andrew Selsky, Pentagon Releases Gitmo Detainees' Names, WASH. PosT, May 15,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/15/AR200
6051500905.html.
103. Brief for Respondents at 1, 12, 43, 47-50, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos.
03-334, 03-343).
104. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008) (discussing the inadequacy of
"enemy combatant" determinations by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals as
a substitute for habeas review).
105. See, e.g., Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that
the petitioner was not "part of" Taliban or Al Qaeda forces when he was taken in-
to U.S. custody and discussing evidence that he was tortured into giving a false
confession); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 20o8), rev'd,
Bensayah v. Obama, 61o F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding the government's basis
for the detention of five petitioners to rest on "so thin a reed" as to be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's admonition to protect petitioners from the risk of er-
roneous detention).
106. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F-3d 1291, 1296 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring in denial of reh'g en banc)).
107. Id.
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trary deprivation of liberty was sufficient to mandate judicial review in the
Guantinamo context, the risk associated with the targeted killing program-of
irreparable deprivation of life-ought to require judicial review a fortiori.
The Obama Administration professes that its actions are not unchecked be-
cause Congress retains "robust" oversight.'a But the reporting of CIA and
JSOC operations is generally limited to intelligence and armed services commit-
tees in the House and Senate-and sometimes only to the leaders of those
committees.o 9 While covert actions by the CIA must be reported to the intelli-
gence committees, unacknowledged military operations by JSOC are not sub-
ject to this requirement."o The latter may be reported to the armed services
committees, but such reports are not mandatory. Indeed, unlike the require-
ment for notification of covert actions, there is no mandatory reporting re-
quirement for unacknowledged JSOC military operations."' As a result, not on-
ly are the vast majority of lawmakers in the dark about the Administration's
targeted killing program, but even those members of Congress who do receive
information have far from a complete and unobstructed view."2 Add to that the
concern that JSOC operates with even less general oversight than the CIA, and
the Administration's avowal of "robust" oversight rings hollow."I
Without the information necessary to make sense of the Administration's
asserted legal interpretations, and certainly without actual facts to help assess
108. Holder, supra note 39 ("[Opposing judicial review] is not to say that the Executive
Branch has ... the ability to target any such individuals without robust over-
sight.... [Tihe Executive Branch regularly informs the appropriate members of
Congress about our counterterrorism activities, including the legal framework,
and would of course follow the same practice where lethal force is used against
United States citizens.").
109. Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of Title lo/Title so
Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 539, 611 (2012).
11o. Id. at 543, 613-15; see Greg Miller, Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatus for
Drone Killing, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for
-drone-killing/2onl/12/13/gIQANPdILP story_4.html ("The disclosure of these
operations is generally limited to relevant committees in the House and Senate
and sometimes only to their leaders.").
ilu. Chesney, supra note 109, at 613-15.
112. See Miller, supra note no (acknowledging congressional "concern with emerging
blind spots" regarding drone strikes).
113. See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN
CONFLICT, THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANS-
WERED QUESTIONS 62 (2012) ("{JSOC] operates with a level of secrecy and free-
dom from scrutiny that matches, and in some cases exceeds, that of the CIA.").
See generally Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, "Top Secret America": A Look at the
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the government's claims about the targeted killing program, public debate and
scrutiny will remain limited. In the absence of a meaningful public or congres-
sional check on the program, or any judicial one, the Administration's assur-
ances and self-selected disclosures about the legality and efficacy of its actions
are essentially what remain. That cannot be enough.
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